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Breaking the Epistemic Pornography Habit:
Cognitive Biases, Digital Discourse Environments, and Moral Exemplars
Andrew D. Spear 
Grand Valley State University
Purpose: This paper analyzes some of the epistemically pernicious effects of use of the Internet 
and social media. In light of this analysis, it introduces the concept of epistemic pornography and 
argues that epistemic agents both can and should avoid consuming and sharing epistemic 
pornography.
Design/Methodology/Approach: The paper draws on research on epistemic virtue, cognitive 
biases, social media use and its epistemic consequences, Fake News, paternalistic nudging, 
pornography, moral philosophy, moral elevation, and moral exemplar theory to analyze the 
epistemically pernicious effects of the Internet and social media.
Findings: There is a growing consensus that Internet and social media activate and enable human 
cognitive biases leading to what are here called “failures of epistemic virtue”. Common 
formulations of this problem involve the concept of “Fake News”, and strategies for responding 
to the problem often have much in common with paternalistic “nudging”. While Fake News is a 
problem and the nudging approach holds out promise, the paper concludes that both place 
insufficient emphasis on the agency and responsibility of users of the Internet and social media, 
and that nudging represents a necessary but not sufficient response. 
Originality/Value: The essay offers the concept of epistemic pornography as a concept distinct 
from but related to “fake news” – distinct precisely because it places greater emphasis on 
personal agency and responsibility – and, following recent literature on moral elevation and 
moral exemplars, as a heuristic that agents might use to economize their efforts at resisting 
irrational cognitive biases and attempting to live up to their epistemic duties. 
Keywords: Cognitive Bias, Fake News, Epistemic Virtue, Epistemic Pornography, Nudge, 
Pornography, Moral Elevation, Moral Exemplar
“…do not send to know for whom the bell tolls; it tolls for thee.”
 (John Donne, Meditation 17)
1. Introduction: The Paradox of the Internet and Social Media 
The Internet and social media make possible unprecedented access to information, analysis, 
alternative points of view, and even to new forms of social and political organization (McIntyre 
2015; Sunstein 2018). At the same time, they appeal to, enable, and even encourage human 
cognitive biases thus leading to both proliferation of false and misleading information, and to 
degradation of the quality and efficacy of public discourse (Polage 2012; Lazer et al. 2018; 
McIntyre 2015, 2019; Sunstein 2018; Vosoughi et al. 2018). From the standpoint of their most 
prominent impact on discourse,i it seems clear that the Internet and social media currently play 
this latter epistemically pernicious role more frequently and more forcefully than they do the 
former epistemically positive one. 
This paper analyzes and proposes a partial solution to the epistemically pernicious effects 
of the Internet and social media. In what follows, a basic set of epistemic virtues is first 
introduced. Having subjects instantiate these or similar virtues is desirable, probably necessary, 
for achieving the goals of objectivity and the likelihood of truth in the formation of beliefs. They 
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are plausibly seen as independent of and so underlying more specific scientific, political, cultural 
or moral disagreements,ii and thus represent an ideal or image, if a partial one, of epistemic 
agents as they might be, and of the sorts of epistemic practices we might hope for from epistemic 
agents as they engage with Internet and social media as well as in belief formation and discourse 
generally. In response to this image of epistemic virtue, some results of current research and 
theorizing in social and evolutionary psychology are considered. The image of human cognition 
these results suggest raises doubts about the extent to which we are able to live up to the 
epistemic virtues outlined, but also helps to explain why the Internet and social media are so 
epistemically pernicious.iii The concept of “Fake News” and the so-called nudge approach to 
dealing with the pernicious epistemic effects of the Internet and social media are then 
considered. While Fake News is a problem and the nudging approach holds out promise, it is 
argued that both place insufficient emphasis on the agency and responsibility of users of the 
Internet and social media. What is needed in addition is a more agent-centered approach that 
emphasizes individual responsibility and at least the aspiration to instantiate intellectual virtues.
In light of this discussion, the concept of “epistemic pornography” is introduced to identify a 
particularly pernicious unit of discourse that flourishes in on-line and social media environments. 
Whereas the concept of fake news primarily suggests passive deception of its victims, epistemic 
pornography emphasizes how information presented in certain ways can enlist the active 
engagement of epistemic agents by appealing to their unguarded psychological needs and 
cognitive biases. There is a close analogy between epistemic pornography and traditional 
pornography, and recognizing this helps to highlight epistemic pornography’s harmful effects. In 
light of these harmful effects, all three major moral theories in philosophy can be seen to imply 
that we have moral duties not to consume or share epistemic pornography. 
Finally, the possibility of a more agent- and personal-responsibility-centered approach is 
defended by way of a review of empirical literature that suggests cognitive biases can be resisted 
and diminished through awareness, intentional effort, and training. In particular, recent work on 
moral elevation and moral exemplar theory in psychology and philosophy provides reason to 
think that the concept of “epistemic pornography” may itself offer a useful heuristic for 
overcoming our cognitive limitations and living up to our epistemic duties. 
2. Human Beings as We Would Have Them: Some Intellectual Virtues 
Contemporary virtue epistemologists have developed the notions of epistemic character and 
virtue in the context of accounts of justified or warranted belief (DePaul and Zagzebski 2003).iv 
On such accounts to be, e.g., justified in holding a belief is for that belief to have been formed as 
a result of some truth-directed and conscientiously exercised intellectual virtue. One way of 
understanding the ideal intellectual conduct it would be desirable for a person to exhibit is to 
describe the set of intellectual virtues that such a person should have and exercise. Even those 
deeply divided on scientific, political, or cultural matters can generally agree that our thinking 
should be aimed at being objective, consistent, and at holding true rather than false beliefs.v 
Here, a list of intellectual virtues consistent with the virtue epistemological approach is briefly 
sketched. The virtues identified represent relatively common ground concerning how an ideal 
epistemic agent would conduct herself.vi Were agents to consistently exhibit these virtues, the 
most pernicious effects of discourse on the Internet and social media could be significantly 
mitigated. Intellectual virtues are here divided, somewhat artificially, into those that are 
primarily self-regarding and those that are other-regarding. 
Concerning self-regarding intellectual virtues, here are five significant ones. First, 
Intellectual honesty is the tendency to hold beliefs for reasons or based on evidence, while 
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controlling for one’s personal preferences, wishes, and biases. Second, open-mindedness consists 
in being willing and able to revise beliefs in the face of new or contrary evidence. Epistemic 
agents are by nature fallible and so should be ready to adjust their beliefs accordingly. Third, 
intellectual imaginativeness is the ability to think of or imagine alternative possibilities that are 
at variance with one’s own views, and to give such possibilities serious consideration. 
Conscientiousness is the synthetic ability to weigh available evidence, positive and negative, in 
one’s belief formation, to determine the (approximate) relative likelihood of one’s beliefs all 
relevant factors considered, and to adjust one’s credence accordingly. Fifth, and finally, 
intellectual humility is a kind of second-order or monitoring virtue that consists in the abilities to 
(i) properly assess the strength of the justification that one possesses for one’s beliefs and (ii) to 
accurately recognize one’s own epistemic abilities and limitations.vii 
Other-regarding epistemic virtues divide into how we treat others when we take in 
reasoning, testimony, etc. from them, and also when we present our own reasoning, views, etc. to 
them. Three of the former and two of the latter are considered.  When listening to testimony or 
argumentation from others, charitability means extending the default supposition of rationality 
and sincerity to one’s interlocutor, while critical trusting means nevertheless being on the 
lookout for possible defeaters concerning either the sincerity or intellectual competence of the 
interlocutor. Bias avoidance is equivalent to what Miranda Fricker has called testimonial justice 
(Fricker 2007), and amounts to actively monitoring so as to avoid allowing bias or prejudice to 
cause one to excessively downgrade or upgrade one’s view of the credibility and intellectual 
competence, and so trustworthiness, of one’s interlocutor. 
When one is testifying to others or trying to convince them, one should practice the 
related virtues of sincerity and epistemic non-maleficence. Sincerity means that, in presenting 
information and arguments to others, one does so only when that information and argument is 
backed by one’s own epistemic virtues, and in a way that is sincere and truthful. Epistemic non-
maleficence means refraining from appealing to the epistemic deficiencies and cognitive biases 
of others in order to enlist their belief in what one is arguing for.
The foregoing epistemic virtues, briefly sketched, encode the central goals of impartial 
use of reason and evidence in the hope of arriving at unbiased and true beliefs, as well as the 
principles of dialogical respect and engagement that such goals imply for one’s dealings with 
others as interlocutors. 
3. Cognitive Biases and their Role in the Epistemic Effects of Internet and Social 
Media 
In this section some main results of current research and theorizing in social and evolutionary 
psychology are introduced. The image of human cognition that this research gives rise to 
challenges the extent to which we are likely to be able to live up to the epistemic virtues just 
outlined, but also helps to explain why the Internet and social media can be so epistemically 
pernicious.
3.1 Human Beings as they Are: The Evolutionary and Social-Psychological Image of Human 
Epistemic Practices 
While the foregoing discussion of epistemic virtues encodes a classical conception of human 
rationality, impartiality, and respect for evidence, contemporary thinking deriving from social 
and evolutionary psychology suggests that human beings are rather ill-disposed to the task of 
living up to this ideal. First, some relatively well-established experimental results concerning 
human rationality are considered. These results are then placed in the context of some recent 
theories of human reason. 
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Concerning rationality itself, there is good evidence that confirmation bias is rampant: that 
individuals pursue or view as salient evidence that supports what they already believe, while they 
fail to look for evidence that conflicts with their beliefs, or fail to notice it when it is presented 
(e.g. Nickerson 1998). When forced to confront defeating evidence for their beliefs, people have 
been shown to double-down (the so-called “backfire effect” (Nyhan & Reifler 2010; Redlawsk et 
al. 2010)) and to raise rather than lower their credence, thus suggesting a kind of resistance to 
counter-evidence even when it is present and to some extent acknowledged. 
Subjects have also been shown to form beliefs and make choices for reasons that are not 
transparent to them, and then confabulate or rationalize after the fact, offering false but plausible 
stories for why they believe (and act) the way they do (Nisbett & Wilson 1977; Hirstein 2009a; 
Sullivan-Bissett 2015). The phenomenon of implicit bias further suggests that people form 
beliefs and make judgments on the basis of stereotypes they are themselves unaware of or even 
claim not to accept (J st et al. 2009; Holroyd et al. 2017). Tthe reiteration effect suggests that 
mere repeated exposure to information makes subjects more likely to rank it as true or likely to 
be true (Hertwig et al. 1997), while source amnesia is a phenomenon in which subjects 
remember a piece of information, but do not remember the source or context from which they 
acquired it (Schachter et al. 1984).viii 
To the foregoing can be added the now relatively well-established result that people tend to 
over-estimate their abilities, including their reasoning abilities, and that this effect tends to be 
most exaggerated precisely in people whose actual skills are relatively worse (Kruger & Dunning 
1999); such self-attributions also tend to persist even when the initial basis for them has been 
discredited (Ross et al. 1975). There thus seems to be a great deal of evidence for the existence 
of deep-rooted and widespread prima facie obstacles to individuals reasoning in accordance with 
the intellectual virtues outlined above. Prominent recent theoretical models of human cognition, 
motivated in part by the foregoing data, also paint a bleak picture of our abilities to live up to the 
ideals of intellectual virtue. Here are three.
- The Dual Processing View 
Daniel Kahneman has been the most prominent advocate of the so-called dual-process view of 
human cognition (2011). The central idea is that there are two kinds of information processing or 
cognition that go on in the human mind. Type-1 processes are quick, automatic, heuristic 
processes that we deploy with little or no conscious thought. These processes tend to have some 
advantages and to be “good enough” for many ordinary purposes, but also tend to be 
conservative and inflexible, and so to lead us into unusual or non-ideal beliefs and decisions. By 
contrast, type-2 processes are slow, deliberative, and conscious. These tend to kick in only when 
type-1 processes are stymied by social or environmental factors, forcing the agent to go into a 
more explicit and conscious mode of thinking. Such “type-2” cognition is generally more 
systematically or objectively rational, but it takes a lot of time and effort, and can be easily 
stymied by additional situational factors or by conflict with type-1 processes. Type-1 processes 
cut deep; they are arguably part of who we are and how we are built. Thus, while it may be 
possible to control for them by constant vigilance and regularly reverting to type-2 reasoning, 
they present, from the standpoint of more idealized epistemic virtue, a kind of constant epistemic 
hazard. In terms of the experimental results just discussed, it is not difficult to imagine e ther 
confirmation bias or implicit bias (e.g. implicit racial bias against a particular group) as the result 
of type-1 cognitive processes working in a relatively automatic way. Jonathan Haidt’s view that 
moral and political judgments are largely automatic and intuitive rather than reflective and 
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rational suggests that they are typically type-1 processes, and so raises similar worries for the 
overall rationality and objectivity of belief and argument on these topics (Haidt 2001).  
- Mercier and Sperber’s Hypothesis
Another recent way of thinking about human cognition and reasoning, namely the evolutionary 
psychological view of Mercier and Sperber, also takes its point of departure from the fact of 
rather widespread human cognitive biases. If such irrationalities are so common, then it is 
unlikely, Mercier and Sperber argue, that the primary evolutionary purpose of reason is to 
achieve objectivity or discover truth. Rather, they maintain that human reasoning was selected 
for primarily for its persuasive or rhetorical role in social contexts: its ability to unify, organize, 
and convince fellow group members, and to maintain and leverage one’s own social status within 
the group (Mercier and Sperber 2011). Thus, the primary purpose of human rationality is rhetoric 
not logic, persuasion not proof. Given such a view, phenomena such as confirmation bias, 
implicit bias, self-justifying confabulations etc. are expected rather than surprising, even as they 
are generally at odds with the epistemic virtues introduced in the previous section (see e.g. 
McIntyre 2015, Ch. 2). 
- Terror-Management Theory 
Finally, terror-management theory, introduced by Ernest Becker (1973) and developed by 
Landau, Solomon, Greenberg, and Pyszczynski (1986; 2007; 2015), suggests, somewhat 
dramatically, that human psychology is best understood in terms of our awareness of our own 
mortality, and that managing this awareness, individually and collectively, is a major function of 
our cognitive faculties. This awareness is dealt with most effectively and most conclusively in 
the context of strong interpersonal constructs of meaning and identity, rendering commitment to 
and preservation of these primary cognitive and existential concerns. Thus, according to terror 
management theory, impartial rational belief formation becomes difficult in cases where serious 
consideration of alternative possibilities and evidence against one’s own worldview amounts to a 
challenge to the stability of that worldview and so ultimately to one’s means of coping with the 
“terror” of confronting an uncertain, cold, and indifferent universe. To the extent that this is 
correct, it makes perfect sense that many of the epistemic virtues introduced above would be 
muted while the various cognitive biases and irrationalities that have been so thoroughly 
documented by evolutionary and social psychologists would be expected insofar as these serve to 
either preserve or protect the core meaning-giving and identity-defining worldview of the agent 
or agents in question. 
In short, the view of human cognition that emerges from evolutionary and social 
psychological considerations suggests epistemic agents are naturally prone to irrationalities and 
to preserving their preferred belief set and commitments. Further, they are averse to cognitive 
dissonance, and likely to let social factors, personal commitments and motivations of a non-
rational nature, as well as simply the path of least resistance determine the direction that their 
thinking and belief-formation takes. Groups of like-minded individuals who hold similar beliefs 
will typically only augment and reinforce these tendencies. The demands of intellectual virtue 
discussed in the previous section are thus harsh indeed for the epistemically flawed and to some 
extent bewildered creature that contemporary evolutionary and social psychology paint us as 
being. 
3.2 Homo Sapiens in the Digital Information Jungle: How the Internet and social media 
harness and amplify Cognitive Biases 
In light of the foregoing, it is not difficult to see how it is that the Internet and social media both 
exploit, nurture, and encourage flawed epistemic practices. Here four prominent though by no 
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means exhaustive ways in which Internet and social media latch onto human cognitive biases in 
epistemically pernicious ways are considered. 
First, the Internet makes available large amounts of content, but places no particular 
constraints on what individuals do or don’t access. Individuals are free to choose from a huge 
array of options via a web search or based on recommendations from an on-line platform, but 
without ever having to look at all or even many of the alternatives. It is thus not surprising that 
beings driven by confirmation bias, aversion to cognitive dissonance, and a craving for 
validation of their beliefs and identity would naturally prefer sources of information and on-line 
contexts that affirm these. The Internet ensures that they will have no trouble finding them, not 
just occasionally, but every moment of every day. Further, the natural human tendency to seek 
confirmation is also reinforced by those Internet platforms that use algorithms and other 
strategies geared to offer users additional content based on their pre-existing searches and 
preferences (Cybenko & Cybenko, 2018; Sunstein 2018; Lombardi 2019). So-called “echo 
chambers” or “information silos” are a natural consequence. To all of this must be added the 
unsettling evidence suggesting that people who seek information on the Internet tend to mistake 
“access to information” for a direct increase in “their own personal understanding” of that 
information (Fisher et al. 2015). Thus, not only does the format of Internet and social media 
activate and enable cognitive biases, it seems simultaneously to encourage users to make flawed 
assessments of their own levels of understanding and knowledge. 
Second, and related to the first point, the Internet and social media make agenda-driven 
and identity- and preference-tailored information very easy to generate, whether for ideological 
or profit-based motives. It is relatively easy to generate an on-line information or news site. If 
one has an agenda, they can use such a site to promote, disseminate, and amplify perceived 
support for that agenda. At the same time, one can seek to set up sites that satisfy existing needs 
and preferences of Internet users. Even if one has no agenda, the information market is no 
different from any other, and satisfying people’s belief- and identity-affirming preferences can 
be profitable as well as ideologically convenient (Lombardi 2019; McIntrye 2019, Ch. 5). 
In addition to the foregoing, a third feature of the Internet and social media is their ability 
to draw together like-minded individuals even if these individuals are geographically dispersed. 
The Internet has no spatial or geographical boundaries. It can thus be a meeting place for like-
minded individuals whose views are in fact outliers to find community and mutual support for 
their views that would not have been available just a few decades ago. As such, fringe, radical, 
and conspiracy-based sub-cultures have a much easier time organizing, engaging in belief- and 
identity-affirming discourse only with each other, and being more publicly visible, thereby 
growing. The messages such groups have to offer can also be artificially amplified via social 
media platforms by the diligent efforts of even a small number of dedicated advocates, especially 
if these are combined with more sophisticated means of dissemination such as the use of fake 
accounts and bots (Cybenko & Cybenko 2018; Sunstein 2018). 
Fourth, and finally, the Internet and related technologies make it possible to replicate and 
repeat the same message generated by the same person or group both cheaply and efficiently, and 
thus to generate the appearance that a message or piece of information is widely shared and 
corroborated by multiple sources when it is not. This repetitive feature of the Internet is 
especially important as it feeds both confirmation bias (a subject who follows only a few selected 
news sites, but who receives “updates” from them once every quarter hour, has a continuous 
flow of perceived confirmation coming in; something no traditional newspaper or source could
previously easily do) and plays off of the combination of source amnesia and the repetition 
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effect, thus potentially affecting the beliefs of even previously unconvinced individuals (Polage 
2012; McIntyre 2015; Cybenko & Cybenko 2018). 
In short, the Internet and social media are vast, preference-based, easy to access, efficient 
to use, able to connect like-minded individuals from far-flung geographical areas, prone to the 
creation of partisan echo-chambers, and able to repeat, reproduce, and amplify particular 
messages and information. These features make them prime exploiters of the human cognitive 
biases discussed above.ix 
4. Two Paths to Epistemic Improvement 
What the foregoing seems to suggest is that while the Internet and social media did not make us 
prone to intellectual blindness, self-serving rationalization, or dogmatic partisanship, if we do not 
take proper precautions it seems clear they will keep us this way—and make us even worse. So, 
what are we to do? Natural human cognitive tendencies push in one direction, while the 
importance of resisting these tendencies in the name of achieving better epistemic results 
individually and collectively push in another. How to achieve this? There are two major options 
or lines of approach that are regularly discussed. While these approaches are not mutually 
exclusive, it is important to appreciate the differences between them, and the limitations of each.  
One approach to the problem is to attempt to restructure the contexts, particularly the digital 
contexts, in which human beings cognize and make decisions in such a way as to neutralize, 
harness, or redirect cognitive biases. This amounts, in various guises, to a version of Thaler and 
Sunstein’s idea of “nudges” (Thaler and Sunstein 2008; McIntyre 2015, Ch. 7; Lombardi 2019). 
On this view, if we want people to make the right choices and pursue the right goals, we need to 
structure the context of reasoning and decision-making in which they operate in such a way as to, 
without explicitly coercing them, push or nudge them toward the right kinds of information, 
reasoning, and decisions. Thus, if we want people to make epistemically rational and genuinely 
informed decisions on the basis of their interactions via the Internet and social media, we need to 
structure the format of this information and the ground rules of these spaces in such a way as to 
point them in the right direction. Perhaps this means banning certain types of content altogether, 
or flagging low-quality or highly partisan content in some extremely noticeable and hard to ignore 
manner, or setting up more robust accountability structures for those who share information in 
digital discourse spaces. Such an approach typically has, as one of its main goals at least, protecting 
Internet and social media users from so-called “fake news” (Rini 2017; Lazer et al. 2018; Cybenko 
& Cybenko 2018; McIntyre 2019, ch. 5), where fake news is understood, roughly, as intentionally 
designed false or misleading information that mimics the appearance and style of traditional 
journalism, but without concern for its objectives or editorial standards (Lazer et al. 2018). 
The alternative approach – not a strict alternative, as the two approaches are compatible in 
certain ways, but nevertheless importantly different – is to focus on the intellectual obligations, 
virtues, and vices of discourse participants. This is the approach that that will be advocated for and 
further articulated in this essay. If individuals made more of an effort to be aware of and control 
for their own cognitive biases, and to apply this to the way in which they consumed, shared, and 
reasoned about news in digital discourse environments, low-quality and partisan-heavy sources 
and arguments would be less effective and, hopefully, less frequent. The approach emphasized in 
what follows takes individuals’ epistemic agency and responsibilities as primary and seeks to 
formulate a response to the epistemic ills of digital discourse in terms of them. In order to provide 
initial motivation for such an approach, the next two sub-sections present reasons why thinking 
about and responding to the pernicious epistemic effects of the Internet and social media in terms 
of fake news and nudging are at best necessary, but not sufficient, for addressing the problem.x 
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4.1 The Passive Orientation of the Concept “Fake News” 
Lee McIntyre has recently defined ‘fake news’ as “disinformation that is deliberately created to 
look like actual news in order to have a political effect” (McIntyre 2019, 173), while Lazer et al. 
(2018) provide a similar definition of fake news as “…fabricated information that mimics news 
media content in form but not in organizational process or intent” (Lazer et al. 2018). Fake news 
is a real problem with a long history (McIntyre 2019, ch. 5) that is significantly amplified and 
exacerbated in digital discourse environments as they currently are (Cybenko & Cybenko 2018; 
Lazer et al. 2018; McIntyre 2019, ch. 5). At the same time, the concept is insufficient as a way of 
thinking about the epistemic problems created by digital discourse environments, and the 
prominent role it currently plays in discussion of these problems itself threatens to contribute to 
perpetuating them.xi 
The main problem with the concept “fake news” is that the characterization of fake news 
as false or misleading information that “mimics” elements of traditional news or journalism 
focuses largely on the intentions of those who create it and, especially, on the deceptive nature of 
such “news” itself, while strongly suggesting passive deception and victimhood when it comes to 
those who consume and share it. Now, if fake news really were subjectively indistinguishable from 
“real” news in the way that a dream or virtual reality computer simulation might be subjectively 
indistinguishable from being awake or from ordinary visual perception of reality, then individuals 
who “fall victim” to it would indeed arguably be innocent, at least not blameworthy, for believing 
and even sharing it as though it were credentialed news reporting. However, at least in the case of 
the vast majority of fake news, this is not where things are. If not always in appearance, then at 
least in its content and in the sources from which it comes, there are many ways to recognize a 
piece of news as fake or at least dubious, such as paying attention to the sources it does or does 
not cite, considering whether one is aware of the source from which the news item comes, 
considering the editorial practices or known political commitments of the source, considering the 
plausibility of the report relative to shared background information and facts, checking the source 
against reporting from other sources already trusted as reliable etc. Further, the fact that unverified 
and false information is flowing freely on the Internet and social media is itself widely and publicly 
known. For any individual who is aware of this, refusal to engage in even limited skepticism and 
verification concerning online information and discourse is equivalent to someone who, having 
been told that a film is fictionalized history in which many characters and events have been altered, 
goes on to watch the film and take all that it portrays as documentary historical fact. Such an 
individual not only could have but arguably does or very easily can know better. Fake news is 
currently a problem not because it is impossible or even extremely difficult for individuals to detect 
– in the way that a radical skeptical scenario might be – but rather, as already argued, it is a problem 
primarily because of existing human cognitive biases that, left unchecked, make it very easy for 
individuals to fall short of epistemic standards and virtues, especially in on-line environments.  
If this is right, however, then to the extent that the concept of “fake news” with its 
associated ideas of manipulation and deception encourages an image of its consumers and sharers 
as essentially passive victims of something undetectable and so outside their control, it encourages 
a climate of epistemic irresponsibility amongst media consumers and digital discourse participants 
that is harmful. Agents who believe that they lack control over their actions have been shown to 
be more willing to cheat, to exhibit higher levels of aggression and diminished helping behavior, 
and even to feel less gratitude for others and for events in their lives (Vohs & Schooler 2008; 
Baumeister et al. 2009; MacKenzie et al. 2014). Encouraging a belief in helplessness or lack of 
control can thus have real consequences. Yet, the dominant concept of “fake news” and its very 
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prominent role in public discourse about disinformation on the Internet and social media does just 
this. What is needed, in addition to the concept of “fake news”, is a concept for thinking about 
epistemic agents’ behavior in digital discourse environments in terms that stress agency, 
accountability, and responsibility. The concept of “epistemic pornography”, to be introduced 
below, is intended to be such a concept. 
4.2 Why Nudging is not Enough 
The primary problem for the nudging approach is that, taken by itself, it largely ignores the 
cultivation of individual autonomy and responsibility, and fails to encourage epistemic reform of 
the cognitive biases it targets. Susceptible to bias and contextual influences though they may be, 
Internet and social media users remain agents (and citizens) with cognitive capacities they are 
responsible for exercising and epistemic duties they ought to fulfil. Merely altering their 
environments in order to make them epistemically “better” not only ignores but may undermine 
these capacities.xii
Consider Phil, an individual who both suffers from an implicit bias against women, and 
typically manages to confabulate concerning his biased judgments and actions.xiii Such an 
individual will have false beliefs about himself, inaccurate assessments of available evidence on 
given occasions (e.g. concerning the quality of resumes from female job applicants, or the 
appropriateness of his behavior in social contexts), and will make judgments that have objectively 
unfair and harmful effects as a result. One way to deal with the harmful social effects of Phil’s 
cognitive biases would be to so arrange relevant contexts and social environments as either not to 
activate his biases, or so as to mitigate their otherwise harmful effects. For example, job applicant 
resumes Phil must review could be cautiously scrubbed of any potentially gender-relevant 
information, including the candidate’s name. If we are concerned to mitigate Phil’s biases in a 
broader range of contexts, we simply need to find ways to alter those contexts so that the biases 
are circumvented. At the extreme, we could simply fit Phil and all those with similar biases with a 
pair of virtual reality glasses and ear-buds that so altered his day-to-day interactions with people 
as to make them appear uniformly androgynous or male, thus rendering it impossible for his 
implicit bias against women to be activated (since he literally never sees women, even when he 
interacts with them). Phil, fearing the potential effects of his own biases, might even agree to wear 
such glasses and earbuds himself, a situation which Thaler and Sunstein would seem to view as a 
permissible kind of nudge (Thaler & Sunstein 2008, 245-58; Wilkinson 2012). 
The first reason such an approach unsatisfactory is simply that it does not address Phil’s 
root epistemic problem or problems. Rather, it leaves him just as he is, with both his cognitive 
biases and flawed self-knowledge largely intact. The nudge approach in this case does not seem 
to change Phil, increase his awareness, or make him a better epistemic (or moral) agent. It simply 
takes him as he is and prevents him from being able to make errors and cause harms he might 
otherwise make and cause. It also leaves him the same epistemic hazard he has always been. The 
moment Phil finds himself in an epistemic environment that has not been engineered to control 
for or defeat his biases, we can expect them to reemerge and be just as harmful as ever. As such, 
nudging of this sort, while perhaps necessary in the short-term to prevent certain immediate 
harms, does not seem to be sufficient to actually assist Phil in the project of epistemic self-
reform: the project of internalizing and living up to the epistemic virtues discussed in section 2 
above. Yet this is something that, so far as it is possible, is also desirable for Phil and for 
epistemic agents generally. 
Related to the foregoing, a second reason why “nudging is not enough” in the case of 
someone like Phil is that Phil is, let us assume, a citizen in a liberal democratic society. As such, 
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the political structure within which he lives and moves presupposes that Phil has some basic set 
of rights and responsibilities, and that he is at least in principle able to participate in the ongoing 
deliberations and democratic processes of his state. If Phil is, in fact, epistemically damaged 
goods to the point where he cannot be trusted to realize epistemic virtues or principles unless 
aided by nudges via manipulated reasoning and decision environments, it is not clear what is left 
of the political suppositions concerning his rights, responsibilities, and capacities as a citizen. It 
may be that the image of human cognition as biased and flawed that is developing in 
contemporary evolutionary and social psychology ultimately leaves little room for the 
democratic ideal of citizens as deliberators concerning factual and normative matters who 
thereby actively participate in ongoing political and social co-existence (Haidt 2001; Zafrilla 
2016). To the extent that this is not the case, however, the “nudge” approach to the problem of 
the pernicious epistemic effects of digital discourse environments is at best necessary but not 
sufficient both because it fails to bring about epistemic self-reform and greater self-knowledge in 
epistemic agents, and because it is, if taken as a complete approach, at odds with the image of 
epistemic agents as citizens and so participants in deliberative democracy. 
5. Epistemic Pornography
In light of the situation just outlined, the notion of “epistemic pornography”  is here introduced 
to identify a particularly pernicious unit of on-line discourse, one that is Janus-faced in that it has 
both epistemic and cognitive-bias- and group-identity-affirming features, thus ultimately playing 
on and encouraging epistemically sub-optimal features of our psychology in a particularly 
distressing way. This section explains what is meant by ‘epistemic pornography’. The next 
section explains how it is related to traditional pornography. 
If “fake news” is “…fabricated information that mimics news media content in form but 
not in organizational process or intent” (Lazer et al. 2018), then some fake news is epistemic 
pornography, and some epistemic pornography is fake news, but the two concepts do not 
coincide. Epistemic pornography does not merely present false or misleading information in a 
seemingly credible guise. Rather, it actively enlists the psychological needs and desires of its 
consumers. They feel satisfied and validated when they consume it, and are aware of this positive 
feeling when they consume and share it. Epistemic pornography does not just deceive, it entices; 
it is a strong temptation that agents who succumb to are (or should be) aware of, but fail to resist. 
It is thus a concept that, unlike “fake news”, includes the active participation and responsibility 
of the agent who consumes it as an essential component. 
More specifically, epistemic pornography is a presentation of information (true or 
false), usually in the form of a meme, tweet, video, short post or clip, but also 
compatible with an essay or news article format, which 
(i) presents its main claims as unconditionally true on the basis of 
(ii) evidence of some sort that is typically inadequate or partial relative to the 
issue under discussion, but is presented as definitive and argument-ending, 
(iii) where the claims being made are distinctly compatible with a particular 
partisan view of the issue, and
(iv)  presented in a congratulatory way that validates those who believe the 
claims being made for so-believing.
(v) The net effect of a piece of epistemic pornography on someone for whom 
it is epistemic pornography is a pleasant or desirable sense of validation, 
satisfaction, and affirmation, one that plays a significant causal role in its 
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effect on their own relevant belief-credences and on the extent to which 
they share or disseminate it.xiv 
It is characteristic of epistemic pornography that it does present some factual or well-reasoned 
information, but that this presentation is significantly partial or incomplete relative to the issue 
under discussion. Further, the total epistemic quality of what is being presented is significantly 
exaggerated. Epistemic pornography gets its grip on people by simultaneously affirming their 
pre-existing worldview and identity commitments and, indeed, by congratulating them for 
having these. It thus works on two levels: an epistemic level and a level of identity-affirmation. 
Its efficacy derives from the way it connects these two levels and thereby allows the individual 
who consumes it to simultaneously take themselves to be believing based on evidence and 
argument while also having their identity and worldview affirmed and even congratulated. What 
makes epistemic pornography so pernicious is that those who consume, enjoy, and share it are 
actively complicit with its message and intent. They make love to the exaggerated epistemic self-
satisfaction it invites, and encourage others to do the same by sharing it. 
Epistemic pornography is thus perfectly suited to fuel confirmation bias and implicit bias, 
and to appeal to agreement with certain “facts” and “reasoning” as a sign or qualification of 
group identity. For these reasons, even in the limiting case where the evidence actually provided 
by epistemic pornography might be quite significant, the evidence will play at most a partial 
causal role in compelling assent or in increasing credence for the person who consumes it, while 
the pleasurable validation and affirmation that it provides does the lion’s share of work in 
sustaining or compelling assent. Naturally, for those who do not already share the identity of the 
identify-affirming aspects of epistemic pornography (parts ii and iv), their experience of it will 
be off-putting and invoke hostility, thus rendering them highly unlikely to be engaged with or be 
convinced by its epistemic content. There is thus a certain perceiver-relativity to epistemic 
pornography. What is epistemic pornography for one person may not be epistemic pornography 
to another. In addition, a key element of epistemic pornography is stylistic: it is exaggerated (in 
its treatment of the evidence on offer relative to the claims being made) and congratulatory 
(tacitly or explicitly congratulating its consumer for accepting the claims on offer for the reasons 
being given). 
5.1 Analogy with regular pornography
Epistemic pornography is analogous in certain fundamental ways to traditional sexual 
pornography. While there is no dearth of literature analyzing pornography, here pornography 
will be defined as a sexually explicit presentation in images or text that is intended by its 
producer and/or appreciated by the consumer, whether consciously or tacitly, specifically for its 
capacity to arouse sexual thoughts and excitement with no regard to other content or 
implications.xv So understood, pornography as such caters to sex and sexuality as such, the 
desires for, fascination with, and enjoyment of these things.xvi As such, it is plausible to say that 
pornography gets its grip on us, probably on just about all of us on first encounter, because of 
how we are built. We are, among other things, sexual beings, and sexually explicit content thus 
gets our attention in pre-reflective ways that most people cannot just ignore.xvii Those who 
consume pornography are thus actively complicit in its intent. They are aroused, enjoy, and are 
gratified by it. As such, even if we take the view that there is nothing inherently wrong with 
producing, consuming or enjoying pornography under certain conditions, nevertheless qua 
pornography it appeals to relatively basic human sexual desires and possibilities, without 
engaging or representing any of the deeper emotional, psychological, or interpersonal 
experiences and virtues that a more elevated or complex type of sexual pleasure or relationship 
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might involve. As such, excessive or single-minded use of pornography invites its user, via the 
triggering of a relatively basic and common human desire, to make a mistake: the mistake of 
thinking that the human sexual relations represented by pornography exhaust the range of human 
sexual and romantic possibilities. Having false beliefs or expectations about central areas of 
human concern is harmful and so, to the extent that consumption of pornography encourages 
this, it is itself harmful.xviii 
Epistemic pornography differs from sexual pornography in that it appeals to our natures 
as believing beings rather than as sexual beings. While these are different aspects of our nature, 
they are both quite basic and correspond to standing desires and needs that we have. Epistemic 
pornography specifically appeals to the deep human desire to have one’s beliefs affirmed, to 
have one’s self affirmed, and to sense that one is part of a community of right-value-sharing 
individuals who recognize and affirm oneself. Just as all humans have sexuality and sexual 
desires of some variety, so all humans seem to have this basic desire to have their beliefs 
affirmed and to sense that their beliefs are shared and affirmed by others (Greenberg et al. 1986). 
Yet, if a piece of information does only this then, just like pornography in and of itself, the piece 
is limited and appeals only to the most basic and primitive elements of our natures as believing 
creatures. It limits or reduces us to the raw desire to be affirmed without regard to why or on 
what basis, in just the way that pornography limits or reduces us to the desire to be sexually 
gratified without regard to why or on what basis. Just as it would be a mistake for someone to 
believe that, having enjoyed pornography, they have enjoyed all that there is to human romantic 
and sexual relations, so it is a mistake for someone to believe, on the basis of having consumed 
validating epistemic pornography, that they have achieved all that there is to achieve as an 
epistemically virtuous believing creature. 
The analogy between traditional pornography and epistemic pornography then has five 
crucial points. First, both appeal to basic or “built-in” human desires or needs. Second, both 
appeal to the respective basic desires or needs in ways that are simplistic, yet carefully tailored to 
cater directly to the relevant desires. Third, both provide a kind of positive gratification, 
affirmation, or arousal when successful. Fourth, the arousal caused by both traditional and 
epistemic pornography is significantly causally related to agents’ active complicity with their 
message and intent. Fifth, and finally, both can result in highly oversimplified, false, or 
unwarranted beliefs. 
Epistemic pornography is, however, potentially more harmful because, unlike with regular 
pornography, it is very difficult to derive the psychological benefits of consuming epistemic 
pornography without also believing it,xix that is, believing that one’s beliefs are indeed validated 
by what one has consumed.xx Epistemic pornography by its nature invites its consumer to 
conflate a sense of affirmation and congratulation for their commitments and identity with 
having actually been given conclusive reasons for holding those commitments and having that 
identity. It thus bypasses intellectual virtues and goes straight, as it were, for the epistemic gut. It 
is thus dangerous to consume epistemic pornography and, by extension, it seems possible to have 
an epistemic pornography problem. Further, in sharing epistemic pornography with others, as 
often happens in on-line and social media environments, one is sharing something that is likely 
to have an adverse effect on their epistemic virtues and respect for epistemic duties as well. For 
this reason, sharing epistemic pornography with others can be as epistemically harmful as 
consuming it oneself.
6. We Should, Can, and Can be More Able not to Consume or Share Epistemic 
Pornography 
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This section briefly argues that we have moral obligations not to consume or share epistemic 
pornography, that there is reason to think that, human cognitive biases notwithstanding, we are 
able to do this, and that the concept of epistemic pornography itself might actually serve as a 
heuristic or moral exemplar that could help agents overcome cognitive biases and exemplify 
intellectual virtues. 
6.1 Intellectual Duties and Virtues to Cultivate in the Face of Epistemic Pornography 
Whethe  viewed from the standpoint of virtue ethics, utilitarianism, or deontology, it seems clear 
that we have a strong prima facie moral obligation to consume as little epistemic pornography as 
possible, and to avoid sharing it with our fellow human beings. 
From the standpoint of epistemic virtue, we ought to avoid epistemic pornography and 
certainly ought not to consume it regularly. Doing so would exercise and strengthen our 
cognitive biases, understood as epistemic vices, and habituate us to think and reason at our 
epistemically worst. Cultivating epistemic virtues means practicing epistemic virtues, and 
consumption of epistemic pornography has no clear role to play in this. For the same reason, we 
should not share epistemic pornography with others. Given our knowledge of human cognitive 
biases and tendencies, doing so would be like giving alcohol to an alcoholic, and would be likely 
to degrade their epistemic virtues.xxi Since, from a virtue ethical standpoint, part of having and 
exercising virtues includes the contribution that these make to a social and political community 
of shared practices and common goods (Aristotle 1984; McIntyre 1984), and the dissemination 
of epistemic pornography is unlikely to contribute positively to realizing such a community, 
there are good moral reasons, from the virtue ethical standpoint, not to share or disseminate 
epistemic pornography as well. 
The Kantian deontological standpoint is more complicated to assess, but it ultimately 
prohibits the consumption and sharing of epistemic pornography (Kant 1785/1985). From a 
Kantian standpoint, much depends on the motivation (whether inclination or duty) of an action, 
and on the maxim by which the action is guided. As Kant points out, an action that seems moral 
might nevertheless be performed due to motivations (and thus based on maxims) that are merely 
prudential or self-interested, and so not in fact relevant for morality.xxii From the traditional 
Kantian standpoint, only an action motivated by duty and a related maxim that passes the test of 
the categorical imperative qualifies as morally right. Since even the very same action can admit 
of very different motivations and so moral statuses, there is always some question, even for the 
agent himself, whether his motivation is really one of inclination or one of duty, a question that 
is resolved most handily in the case where inclination and duty clearly require opposite actions, 
and where the individual acts from duty (refrains, e.g. from cheating or from lying) even though 
doing so would clearly be in his own interests. 
In addition to having the right motivation, the maxim of the agent’s action, for Kant, must 
satisfy the categorical imperative. It must be universalizable without contradiction, treat 
humanity as an end in itself rather than a means, and be a candidate for adoption in a “kingdom 
of ends”. Otherwise the action is not truly an action done from duty. Difficult as it may be to 
imagine, an agent could genuinely believe that it is his duty to lie in order to achieve his ends, 
even though he has no desire or inclination to do so. In such a case, the agent might have the 
right motivation (be genuinely motivated by respect for duty) yet be mistaken about what his 
duty is (be acting on a maxim that in fact fails to satisfy the categorial imperative). 
In light of the foregoing, what have been called “intellectual virtues” in section 2 above 
can be relatively easily reformulated as maxims of belief formation. Once this has been done, all 
or at least most of them turn out to be moral duties according to Kantian ethics. On a Kantian 
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account, rational self-legislating beings presumably aspire to accuracy as well as universality in 
the beliefs and maxims that they adopt. In other words, rational beings, “humanity” in Kant’s 
terms, are normatively oriented toward warranted true beliefs. Any motive or maxim that 
undermines or contradicts this orientation, in oneself or in others, is thus a maxim that 
disrespects humanity by subordinating the rational and so legislative capacities of the individual 
to inclinations such as laziness, the desire for psychological validation, or the desire for a sense 
of group belonging.xxiii Similarly, attempting to win rational consent from another person by 
appealing, not to their rational and legislative faculties, but rather to their inclinations (violating 
the virtue of “epistemic non-maleficence” discussed above) amounts to treating that individual as 
a means to one’s ends. Thus, both consuming and sharing epistemic pornography, insofar as 
doing so violates maxims derivative of the intellectual virtues discussed above, also violates the 
“humanity” formulation of the categorical imperative. Thus, from the Kantian standpoint, agents 
have a duty not to consume or share epistemic pornography.
In addition, cases where a subject forms beliefs or takes herself to acquire additional 
confirmation for beliefs based on epistemic pornography will typically be cases of the sort Kant 
worried about where the subject conflates the rational requirement for evidence, truth, and 
respect for duty, with the inclination to feel validated and affirmed in one’s beliefs and identity.  
Since moral actions are not actions motivated by inclination, any case where a subject forms 
beliefs based on epistemic pornography primarily or solely as a result of its appeal to their 
inclination will be a case that is morally problematic and so objectionable from the Kantian 
standpoint. 
Finally, from a consequentialist perspective, both believing false things and the social and 
political divisions that doing so fuels seem to be all-things-considered bad. Indeed, the mere fact 
that widespread and regular use and sharing of epistemic pornography could, e.g., heavily 
influence a democratic election for the worse would likely be reason enough for 
consequentialism to reject its regular or widespread dissemination and consumption. Thus, from 
a consequentialist standpoint one should rarely or never consume epistemic pornography and 
almost never share it as well.xxiv 
6.2 Signs of Hope: Overcoming Bias
Just because we have relatively clear duties not to consume or share epistemic pornography, this 
does not necessarily mean that we are able to refrain from doing so. Ought typically implies can, 
yet the litany of cognitive biases discussed in section 3 above would seem to suggest that it will 
be difficult if not impossible for us not to consume or share epistemic pornography. The situation 
does not, in fact, seem to be so dire. While the picture of human cognition offered up by 
evolutionary and social psychology shows that it will be difficult for us to live up to our 
epistemic obligations concerning epistemic pornography, there is other social psychology 
literature that suggests that cognitive biases can be resisted and diminished through awareness, 
intentional effort, and training. 
Kennet and Fine have argued, based on a review of available research, that subjects who both 
(i) become aware of a cognitive bias and (ii) desire not to be biased, are able to override the bias 
so long as they have the cognitive resources (freedom from excessive stress, tight time-
constraints, etc.) to do so (Kennett and Fine 2009, 89). Further, it is possible to become aware of 
one’s cognitive biases. On the one hand, one might do this by carefully reading some of the 
social and evolutionary psychology literature discussed in section 3, and making an effort to 
track one’s own thought and behavior patterns for bias. Additionally, we might observe our own 
behavior (e.g. with regard to a particular group, or our argumentative behavior in relation to a 
Page 14 of 21Journal of Information, Communication & Ethics in Society
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Journal of Inform
ation, Com
m
unication & Ethics in Society
Breaking the Epistemic Pornography Habit 15
particular topic over time) and the explanations that we provide for that behavior, and check for 
discrepancies (e.g. Holroyd 2015). Further, researchers such as Poos et al. (2017) have found that 
it is possible to mitigate or reduce the effects of bias, particularly confirmation bias, through 
structured training programs. 
In short, resisting cognitive biases may be difficult, but it is by no means impossible if 
subjects work to achieve the right amount of self-awareness, and to make an effort to train 
themselves to perform in epistemically virtuous rather than cognitively biased ways. 
6.3 “Epistemic Pornography” as Useful Heuristic in Resisting Bias and Living up to our 
Epistemic Duties 
So, we both should (sect. 6.1) and can (sec. 6.2) work to overcome our cognitive biases, and so 
work not to consume or share things such as epistemic pornography in particular. With this in 
mind, there is reason to believe that the concept of “epistemic pornography” may itself offer a 
useful heuristic for overcoming our cognitive limitations and living up to our epistemic duties. 
As discussed in the previous section, being vigilant concerning cognitive biases and overcoming 
them requires both awareness and effort. One of the reasons cognitive biases are so persistent is 
that both awareness and effort require significant time and cognitive resources. Thus, under 
conditions where a subject is already stressed, confronting multiple demands on her attention, or 
crunched for time (surely the majority of situations we find ourselves in), it is easy for even the 
most conscientious of subjects to let her guard down and so, due to lack of awareness or effort, 
let cognitive biases have sway. It is here that getting subjects to understand, internalize, and 
regularly think about the concept of epistemological pornography might be useful. 
Recent empirical work on moral psychology suggests that subjects who are exposed to 
“moral exemplars”, other individuals who engage in particularly noble or praiseworthy actions, 
experience moral elevation, which consists in feelings of elevation and inspiration, positive or 
optimistic thoughts about humanity, and the desire to improve one’s self or to improve the 
condition of others. Significantly, experiences of moral elevation have motivational and 
ultimately behavioral consequences (subjects who experience moral elevation tend to feel 
motivated to behave in ways consistent with this emotion, and this shows in at least some of their 
behavior) (Haidt 2000; Pohling and Diessner 2016). Research on moral elevation has thus far 
focused primarily on (i) positive moral exemplars and (ii) on relatively clear other-directed 
actions, actions that (a) are done primarily for the sake or good of some other or others and that 
(b) ignore or to some extent go against the interests of the person taking the action. 
Linda Zagzebski has, however, suggested expanding the idea of a moral exemplar (and so 
of the moral emotions relevant to it) to include both positive and negative exemplars, and both 
moral and intellectual virtues (and vices). In light of the foregoing discussion, there is good 
reason to view epistemic pornography in this light. “Consumer of epistemic pornography” is (or 
at least should be) a negative moral exemplar, one for which the appropriate emotional response 
is not moral elevation, but moral contempt. Assuming that similar motivational and behavioral 
consequences follow from negative as from positive moral exemplars, possession of the concept 
of “epistemic pornography consumer” or something very like it could actually help individuals 
better fulfil their epistemic duties as they confront the bias-harnessing and rationality-
undermining tendencies of the Internet and social media. To the advice “beware of fake news” 
we might add “don’t be an epistemic pervert” or “don’t indulge in epistemic pornography” as a 
short-hand guide for epistemic agents. Epistemic pornography condenses into a single concept 
the idea of gross indulgence of the “lower” or “more base” aspects of our humanity, potentially 
to the exclusion of “higher” and “more elevated” aspects of ourselves (objectivity, reason, and 
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virtue), and the concept as presented here is specifically framed in terms of avoiding cognitive 
biases. It may thus be a morally and intellectually useful concept for subjects to think in terms of 
as they make the effort to modify their discursive behavior and live up to their epistemic 
obligations. A subject who regularly asks herself, as she consumes or shares Internet and social 
media discourse, “am I enjoying epistemic pornography?” or “am I sharing epistemic 
pornography?” may be in possession of a condensed and useful way to regularly check and 
control for the operation of her cognitive biases. 
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i In particular on social and political discourse in all of its forms, including those involving basic facts, common 
sense, and seemingly established scientific theory.
ii They are thus plausibly seen as non-partisan constituents of Rawlsian public reason (Rawls 1993, Lecture VI; 
Wenar 2017, 3.1 – 3.6).
iii The negative epistemic impact of Internet and social media is much less surprising when the image of human 
cognition that is to be found in recent social and evolutionary psychology is taken into account (Haidt 2001; 
Kahneman 2011; Mercier & Sperber 2011; McIntyre 2016). Human beings, it would seem, come pre-loaded with a 
suite of cognitive biases and predispositions whose connection to objectivity and truth are tenuous, and the Internet 
and social media exploit, encourage, and enable these (Sunstein 2018; McIntyre 2016, pp. 101-102). 
iv The classical virtue tradition envisions flourishing as the ultimate human good, and takes the possession of 
interrelated moral and intellectual virtues to be constitutive parts of this good. Thus, to live well or flourish means, 
in part, to cultivate, possess, and exercise virtues, understood as dispositions of mind and character (Aristotle 1984; 
McIntyre 1984; Slote et al. 1997). Contemporary “virtue epistemology” takes this tradition, largely, as its point of 
inspiration and departure for thinking specifically about issues of evidence, justification, and knowledge. 
v They are thus plausibly seen as non-partisan constituents of Rawlsian public reason (Rawls 1993, Lecture VI; 
Wenar 2017, 3.1 – 3.6).
vi While I take the following to be epistemic virtues, I would be equally willing to view them as epistemic duties, 
ways that we are normatively obliged to think if we wish to arrive at primarily true and impartial beliefs.
vii At first, this last virtue might seem unnecessary insofar as someone who really possesses the first four would in 
fact, most likely anyway, typically believe and behave in warranted or rational ways. However, I think that second-
order assessments of one’s own evidence and epistemic abilities can themselves play a role in both belief formation 
and behavior. For example, a person might lack the virtue of intellectual imaginativeness and so fail to consider 
alternative possibilities to their existing beliefs. However, what they then do about this in terms of how strongly they 
continue to hold their existing beliefs may well depend on whether they themselves are a good judge of the extent to 
which they possess the virtue of intellectual imaginativeness. Thus, accurate intellectual self-assessment is itself an 
epistemic virtue, one the presence or absence of which can make a significant difference in the beliefs that an agent 
actually holds. 
viii Contextual and especially social factors also seem to play a significant role in the extent to which individuals are 
epistemically sincere, unbiased, or otherwise virtuous.
ix Further, while there are undoubtedly many actors who do intentionally try to exploit these features of the Internet 
to achieve persuasion and mobilize people on the cheap, no conspiracy is needed. Natural human tendencies 
interacting with the Internet as medium will naturally encourage and reward the irrationalities discussed above, 
generating a kind of feedback loop in which human biases feed the growth of Internet and social media communities 
and behaviors just described, which in turn further feed, validate, and encourage human biases.  
x An additional reason, which I will not develop at length here, is that a “nudging” approach raises concerns about 
intellectual freedom and freedom of speech (Mill 1859/1961). Interventions in the content and flow of information to 
be found on the Internet and in social media do amount to interventions in what kinds of ideas and arguments are 
heard and disseminated in public discourse. The worry that this could easily transform into censorship, especially if 
the agencies responsible for such interventions are either government agencies or private companies with commercial 
interests, is thus a real and significant one not to be taken lightly. At the same time, traditional ideas and arguments 
concerning freedom of speech and expression are complicated by the digital environment, especially in light of the 
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extent to which information and ideas on the Internet and in social media are simultaneously units of discourse and 
also commodities, by the use of preference-responsive algorithms in search engines and social media platforms to 
tailor and adopt content to individual users, and by the way in which these things can be artificially manipulated for 
both profit and ideological ends (Cybenko & Cybenko 2018; Napoli 2018; Lombardi 2019). In briefly raising concerns 
about freedom of expression here I thus do not mean to be taking a dogmatic “marketplace of ideas” approach to the 
issue that would eschew any type of intervention or moderation of digital discourse environments as an unwarranted 
intrusion on rights to free speech. I would argue, however, that even if we grant that digital discourse environments 
require rethinking traditional assumptions about when and to what extent the right to freedom of expression can be 
regulated or restricted, even the most adequate possible regulatory regime will be, as I will argue for the strategy of 
nudging itself in section 4.2 below, necessary but not sufficient for addressing the pernicious epistemic effects of 
Internet and social media. 
xi One problem with “fake news” as a dominant cultural concept for thinking about the epistemic effects of Internet 
and social media is how easily it can be coopted (Bocher 2017; McIntyre 2019, 111). While I will not discuss the co-
opting of the “fake news” concept here, I think that part of what makes it readily possible is the way in which, as I 
do discuss here, the concept of “fake news” suggests passive victimhood and deception in those who consume it, 
rather than active agency and responsibility. 
xii On the issue of nudging, manipulation, and autonomy, see Wilkinson 2012. 
xiii For insightful discussion of such a case, see Sullivan-Bissett 2015. 
xiv Following Gopnik (2000), epistemic pornography provides its consumer with a cognitive orgasm of the type 
appropriate to genuine understanding of an issue, but on the cheap and by providing, at best, a partial or pseudo-
understanding. 
xv This definition of pornography is similar, though not identical, to that proposed by Joel Feinberg (1983).
xvi I do not consider this to be a perfect definition of ‘pornography’, but one that is good enough for present 
purposes. In addition to definitional issues, there are both moral and political questions surrounding the issue of 
pornography, many of which I am not raising here (see e.g. Watson 2010). 
xvii Measurements of the location (Lykins et al. 2006) and duration (Imhoff et al. 2010) of attention as measured by 
how long subjects’ eyes remained focused under controlled conditions suggests that sexually explicit or 
pornographic material does in fact both get and hold human attention quite readily. Taking the analogy with 
epistemic pornography one step further, it also seems to interfere with upstream reasoning and decision-making 
processes in at least some cases (Laier et al. 2014). There is also evidence that use of sexual material or appeals in 
marketing also tends to be rated by subjects as “more persuasive”, even as such subjects are not necessarily able to 
give arguments or support for the choices made based on such appeals (Reichert et al. 2001). 
xviii Discussions of the harmfulness of pornography fall, roughly, into two parts. A normative part where the question 
of just what constitutes a harm must be answered, and an empirical part where some type of causal relationship 
between pornography and the relevant harm must be established (Watson 2010). It is uncontroversial that rape is a 
kind of harm, so some who argue that pornography is harmful do so on the grounds that individuals who consume a 
lot of pornography, or a lot of certain kinds of pornography, are more likely to commit rape (see Linz & Malamuth 
1993, Ch. 2 for discussion). Similarly, the question of whether there is such a thing as “pornography addiction” and 
whether or not it is harmful requires both a definition of the relevant harms (e.g. increased feelings of isolation, 
breakdown of intimate interpersonal relationships) and empirical support for the claim that excessive pornography 
consumption causes or contributes to such harms (rather than, for example, the causation going in the other 
direction, with excessive pornography use being a consequence rather than a cause of intimate relationship 
breakdowns) (Duffy et al. 2016). For my purposes here, what is most important is the analogy between traditional 
pornography and what I am calling epistemic pornography. Even in the case of traditional pornography, then, I am 
interested first and foremost in “epistemic harms”, false or unwarranted beliefs about human sexuality and intimate 
relationships that subjects may come to have as a result of consuming pornography. 
xix I think it is possible to consume epistemic pornography in other ways, for example, ironically. Or as part of 
research on a particular media environment or cultural or political group. However, in such cases, the psychological 
validation that epistemic pornography provides qua epistemic pornography will not be experienced by the individual 
consuming it. Researchers such as Vosoughi et al. (2018), who study the ways in which false information propagates 
across Internet and social media, are no doubt exposed to a great deal of what I would call epistemic pornography. 
However, given their interest and attitude in looking at this material, it is highly unlikely that they derive the 
psychological benefits from it that it would confer on individuals who do consume it as epistemic pornography. 
xx I would invite empirical study of the claim being made here: that the psychological needs epistemic pornography 
appeals to – in particular the need to feel that one’s beliefs are validated and that one is part of a community that 
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shares and affirms one’s beliefs – typically cannot be (i) activated and gratified while (ii) the subject does not accept 
the truth or accuracy of the source of information doing the activating and gratifying. However, on the assumption 
that human beings generally seek to eliminate cognitive dissonance, and that feeling gratified by a piece of 
information or affirmation while simultaneously lacking confidence in its accuracy or sincerity would cause 
cognitive dissonance, I think the assertion is at least prima facie plausible. 
xxi Indeed, sharing epistemic pornography with others probably violates the other-regarding epistemic virtue of 
epistemic non-maleficence discussed in section 2 above. 
xxii For example, the merchant who charges all customers the same price, thus respecting them and treating them 
equally, may do so purely out of inclination or self-interest: if it became common knowledge that he charged 
different individuals different prices, this might cause people to trust him less and so not to purchase from him, thus 
hurting his bottom line. On the other hand, the same merchant could treat all individuals equally (charge them all the 
same price, not alter the scales, etc.) motivated specifically by his duty not to lie or by his duty to respect the dignity 
of all rational beings equally.
xxiii Indeed, such maxims may contradict themselves outright. If the maxim of an agent’s action is something like 
“avoid considering alternative hypotheses in order to be able to continue holding a preferred belief”, and we assume 
that considering alternative hypotheses increases the likelihood of a belief being true and that what agents want of 
their preferred beliefs is not merely to continue holding them, but for them to be true, then what the maxim actually 
councils is to avoid a method that is necessary for ensuring one’s beliefs are true in order to ensure that one’s beliefs 
are true. So put, such a maxim seems to fail Kant’s universalizability formulation of the categorical imperative as 
well. 
xxiv As with all (act-) consequentialist prohibitions, the prohibition on consuming and sharing epistemic pornography 
must, of course, be qualified. From a consequentialist standpoint there may be extreme or outlier situations in which 
consuming epistemic pornography or, perhaps more likely, intentionally sharing it in hopes of influencing public 
opinion in order to prevent some disaster, might be morally justified. For example, widespread acceptance of anti-
vaccine conspiracy theories could result in a public health crisis (widespread incidences of diseases such as measles) 
under conditions where, unfortunately, convincing the anti-vaccine community by rational means might not be 
feasible. Under such circumstances, using epistemic pornography or similar rhetorical strategies designed to exploit 
built-in cognitive biases and predispositions of anti-vaccine proponents for rhetorical or persuasive purposes may be 
the only way to forestall the developing health crisis. As such, sharing of epistemic pornography would seem to be 
not only permissible, but even obligatory by act-consequentialist standards. In response I would make two points. 
First, even if there are such cases, so long as they are not widespread and frequent in ordinary life, consequentialism 
will still typically and most of the time prohibit consuming and sharing epistemic pornography. Second, however, I 
take the foregoing point to be a limitation rather than a virtue of act-consequentialism itself. I take the primary 
worries about pernicious epistemic effects of Internet and social media to have as their context a liberal democratic 
political system dedicated to relatively widespread and non-negotiable respect for individual rights, and I take the 
idea of individual rights in a democratic society to be premised, in part, on the rights and abilities of citizens to 
think, deliberate, judge, and form beliefs for themselves. Widespread or systematic use of rhetorical instruments 
such as epistemic pornography to bring about consent to a particular view by manipulating built-in cognitive biases 
either amounts to a bypassing of the rights and abilities of individuals as citizens to form beliefs autonomously 
(which would be objectionable, at least prima facie, within the framework of liberal democratic politics), or amounts 
to a declaration that this ability is exaggerated or non-existent, which amounts to skepticism about some of the basic 
premises of liberal democratic politics and society itself. While such skepticism is a specter that haunts much of my 
thinking about these issues, my actual commitments remain to a liberal democratic political context, and so to the 
more Kantian (and to some extent virtue ethical) moral suppositions that underly it. As such, my tendency is to 
reject concerted violation of the citizens’ rights to intellectual autonomy even when such violation might bring about 
better overall consequences. 
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